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THE AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A MIXED MARRIAGE

BY

COMMANDER JOHN E. BRADLEY, JR., USN

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arises not only during civilian debate about the matter but also in an apparent reluctance of many military leaders to fuse together into a coherent national military strategy the Army's and Navy's doctrine. Both Services must realize the need for a joint strategy, rather than simply lend lipservice to the idea of joint operations. Since both doctrines are so similar and requires the support of each other for ultimate success, a marriage between the two obviously needs to be arranged. The Joint Chiefs should start this process through the establishment of a joint strategy commission whose goal would be to produce an Air, Land, Sea Doctrine; but whose effect would also produce a more concrete realization within the military Officer Corps that jointness is not only here to stay but also must be an everyday way of life. Once the strategy is written and the military idea of jointness crystallize, then we should allow the military debate to focus on resource allocation rather than the competence of our strategy.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY:
A MIXED MARRIAGE?

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Commander John E. Bradley, Jr., USN

Captain Peter D. Reiniger, USN
Project Adviser

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
7 April 1986

ABSTRACT

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Much of the military reform debate has centered around the question of whether the AirLand Battle Doctrine or the Maritime Strategy is the correct one for the United States, as if they were mutually exclusive. The thrust of this entire portion of the debate needs to be refocused and the Joint Chiefs of Staff must take the initiative in doing so. The facts support the idea that both doctrines are one in the same at the operational level of war; they are both based on identical, sound, viable military concepts. The problem arises not only during civilian debate about the matter but also in an apparent reluctance of many military leaders to fuse together into a coherent national military strategy the Army's and Navy's doctrine. Both Services must realize the need for a joint strategy, rather than simply lend lipservice to the idea of joint operations. Since both doctrines are so similar and requires the support of each other for ultimate success, a marriage between the two obviously needs to be arranged. The Joint Chiefs should start this process through the establishment of a joint strategy commission whose goal would be to produce an Air, Land, Sea Doctrine; but whose effect would also produce a more concrete realization within the military Officer Corps that jointness is not only here to stay but also must be an everyday way of life. Once the strategy is written and the military idea of jointness crystallizes, then we should allow the military debate to focus on resource allocation rather than the competence of our strategy.



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The debate rages on! It has made instant experts out of almost anyone who has joined in; it has also made non-experts out of many who, despite their credentials, continue to argue just for the sake of discussion. The topic has been the United States' National Military Strategy; with a dual focus, first, on the United States Navy Maritime Strategy and, second, on the United States Army AirLand Battle Doctrine. The purpose of this essay is not to join in the debate nor necessarily to call a halt to it, but rather to refocus its constructive effort. Both the Maritime Strategy and the AirLand Battle Doctrine are based on the same, sound military operational concepts; they can both carry the United States well into the twenty-first century with the knowledge that our strategy is one of deterrence and, if deterrence fails, of warfighting designed to terminate the war on favorable terms. The debate should not be over whether the Navy needs 600 ships or whether the Army needs light divisions, but rather how these two military concepts can be married together into a single union for effective defense. Many obstacles need to be overcome; not the least of which is the lack of realization that Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle are of the same ilk, born of the same military thought. For some reason or other it has become fashionable to pit one against the other, not realizing that each operational concept depends on the other for ultimate success. While there are other obstacles, many of which are internal to the military institution, that need be hurdled before air-land-sea forces are effectively joined into a united front, a discussion of the Maritime Strategy and the AirLand Battle concept as they separately exist today is needed.

separated by two massive temperate seas from the rest of the developed world. It is hardly a wonder then that we have developed into a formidable sea power, able to project that power into the far reaches from our homeland. The United States Navy has in modern times always been a conglomerate of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates able to respond quickly and decisively to a crisis large or small. However, long has the modern day Naval officer wondered just how all of this maritime might would be used in concert; how does the Navy intend to fight as a whole. An articulated strategy was needed not only to silence those who were concerned that the Navy was building its forces without an overall plan to use them but also to satisfy the professional need of the Navy's own tactical leaders to learn and understand that strategic and operational thought was the driving force behind the effort. The concept of a maritime strategy began to take form in 1979 in the testimony and writings of the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward. His ideas of a forward defense in concert with our allied nations, of a flexible offense not totally dependent on a nuclear arsenal were an initial articulation of what our strategy is today. It was not until 1982 with Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins did the maritime strategy take on a more concrete, debatable, written form. The first major problem was that the majority of the adopted strategy was in a classified form which lead many ersatz military experts to react hastily without proper information. Most recently however both Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins have laid out in unclassified forums the existent Maritime Strategy, its required resources and concomitant concepts. The current

Maritime Strategy relies on three principal concepts: peacetime presence; crisis response; and warfighting; the latter having three distinct phases. Peacetime presence is certainly not a new naval idea; the U.S. Navy has long prided itself on its ability to "be there". Forward naval deployment to key interest areas around the world provides a credible deterrence to enemy misadventurism and a reactive force across the spectrum of conflict. Peacetime presence shows our allies that we are committed to Western defense and allows us myriad opportunities for combined exercises and port visits. This forward worldwide naval presence is an integral part of the overall strategy, allowing the second concept, that of crisis response, to be operative and effective.

Global conflict, of course, must be avoided but should it occur, it will have most likely arisen from the escalation of a minor crisis. Maritime strategy then out of necessity must concern itself with crisis response with an objective of crisis control and de-escalation. Naval forces are an optimum tool for crisis response not only because of their presence and mobility but also because of their flexibility. They can be inserted quickly or gradually, obtrusively or inobtrusively, offensively or defensively. This pillar of the Maritime Strategy, if used correctly, can have an enormous influence on deterrence and quickly protect our national interests throughout the world. Unfortunately, however, a strategy must be prepared to accept the fact that deterrence can fail and provide a concept to fight and favorably terminate hostilities if necessary. The third concept of the Maritime Strategy is that of warfighting. The concept considers global conflict and is divided into three major phases: deterrence or transition to war, seizing the initiative, and carrying the fight to the enemy.

Phase One has as its principal goal a continuance of deterrence, recognizing that, at this neophyte stage of the conflict, avoidance if possible is the most sensible avenue. The strategy calls for early and decisive use of global seapower to signal our intent to defend and to cede no vital area to the enemy by default. Keys to the success of this phase are quick and forthright national decisionmaking and immediate and geographically correct forward naval deployment. Such a combination would deny the enemy the ability to initially interdict our sea lines of communication while at the same time allow us, with allied assistance, to counter any aggressive move that the enemy does undertake. While the Maritime Strategy does not outline tactical moves nor does it establish specific time-phased operations, it would certainly be during this phase that initial tactical use of Marine amphibious forces and Naval air forces need be considered if not in fact employed. It is also during this phase that the strategy calls for the appropriate reserve force activation and the commencement of military sealift. Quick and decisive action is the mainstay of this phase, all in the hope that the deterrence provided will make the enemy realize that what would be lost due to his aggressiveness would not outweigh the gain. At this point we are prepared to fight and should our deterrence fail, Phase Two of the warfighting strategy is to seize the initiative.

In warfighting one key to the destruction of the enemy forces is initiative. In this particular phase of Maritime Strategy, not only is enemy force destruction an objective, but also alliance solidarity, gained by demonstrating to our allies our determination and willingness to counter aggression. The classic elements of a war at sea are a

pivotal mainstay of this phase; anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and all of their associated supporting operations. Seizing the initiative in the modern naval theater is a complex concept, requiring a dilution of the enemy's effort, a diversion of their attention, and a division of their forces. Controlling the type and tempo of the conflict is necessary if we are to maintain the initiative and attempt to apply pressure on the enemy to end the war on our terms. Specifically the Maritime Strategy calls for the destruction of the enemy attack submarine as far forward as possible to negate their ability to interdict our vital lines of resupply. The enemy air threat must be neutralized with particular attention paid to bomber and missile launching aircraft, platforms which could return to fight tomorrow's battle. Allied support is critical in this area as well as the area of countering enemy surface ship capabilities. We will rely heavily on our allied navies to bottle up and destroy the enemy fleet as it ventures forth to join the conflict. It is during this phase that the massive striking power of the Navy's carrier battle groups will be employed to its fullest; not only as a destructive tool against the enemy fleet but also as a mobile force lending offensive power to the land battle, whether it be in its most likely location of Europe or elsewhere. Throughout this phase the Maritime Strategy calls for, as necessity must dictate, continued emphasis on logistics and sustainability in order to establish and then maintain our aggressive, forward operation. It is at this point in the conflict that the strategy evolves into Phase Three, that of carrying the fight to the enemy.

The foremost goal of the strategy, and in particular of Phase Three, is to bring about war termination on terms favorable to the

United States and our allies. During this final phase, the Navy would assist in the allied effort of pressing home the initiative, continued destruction of enemy forces, maintaining open sea lines of communication and regaining any lost territory. Naval forces must contribute to war termination by exerting global pressure on the enemy, thereby denying him the luxury of concentrating his forces on a single front or even to a single theater. Naval forces must, in addition, destroy effectively opposing naval forces and influence the land battle by limiting the enemy's redeployment ability and enhancing our own. If war termination is still elusive, this final phase of the Maritime Strategy is prepared to force termination on the enemy through a credible threat of attack on his homeland or attack on ballistic missile submarines. Faced with either of these two possibilities, the enemy hopefully would realize that his own strategy and counter strategy have failed, and war termination would result.

The Maritime Strategy, then, is one of deterrence, and, failing that, is one of aggressive action denying the enemy the use of his own resources, favorably effecting the land battle, and culminating in war termination. The existence of a land battle is a thread which runs through the Maritime Strategy; we need now to focus our attention on that particular aspect of the conflict and to take a look at current United States Army Doctrine. It is a doctrine that is separate from the naval viewpoint, and since 1982 has been termed the AirLand Battle Doctrine.

technology; one can easily envision conflict spread over an immense geographical area. This is caused not only by the extended range of today's ultra modern weapon systems but also by the convoluted entanglement of the world's military and economic alliances. An isolated battle over a single portion of land or even over a minor ideological position by super powers is hard, if not impossible, to imagine. It is this very point that gave birth to the AirLand Battle doctrine; no longer can the soldier look at a battle from a straightline perspective but rather must concern himself with an in-depth approach.

Another fact that the AirLand Battle doctrine establishes from the very beginning is that a joint effort of both land and air forces is required for victory. The doctrine is one of a close union between ground and air attack, amassing individual firepower into a cohesive, effective force. There are four subjective cornerstones to the Army's doctrine, starting with the need for initiative.

Whether it is seized or whether it was possessed from the beginning, having the initiative is the foremost key to winning a battle and ultimate victory. The initiative must be maintained, mandating aggressive, competent leadership at all levels of the force. The AirLand Battle doctrine is quite explicit in this. The second cornerstone is one characterized by the word "depth." It too is an aggressive idea, forcing the commander to think ahead, to attack enemy forces before they can be brought to bear in combat. The idea of depth structures a concept of deep battle in which a battlefield commander uses not only his long range sensors and weapons but also his training, initiative, and long range planning to extend his area of influence and concern. Along with initiative and depth, Army doctrine espouses

agility, the third corner of the AirLand Battle. As the word suggests, agility is the ability to outmaneuver your enemy, to quickly exploit his weaknesses and your strengths, to immediately take advantage where advantage may lie. Again the doctrine places heavy importance on the quick-mindedness of their leaders, people who are flexible and can operationally beat their enemy to the punch. The fourth and last cornerstone which anchors the doctrine's foundation is that of synchronization, a rather straightforward concept but most difficult in practice. Air and ground forces must be expertly coordinated, so that maximum combat effort is realized and no wasted effort is knowingly allowed. A unity of effort, aimed at the destruction of the enemy and guided by the commander's overall concept, is the heart of synchronization.

The AirLand Battle doctrine is a concept, but it also, to a great extent, is a tactical blueprint, emphasising battlefield command and control, planning and coordination; the specifics of which are unnecessary for this discussion. A closer look at just a few of the doctrine's tactical aspects will lend much to its understanding however; the doctrinal issues of maneuver, deep battle, rear battle and logistic support are ones that crystallize the Army's thinking.

Maneuver is "the dynamic element of battle, the means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain the advantages of surprise, position, and momentum which enable small forces to defeat larger ones."⁴ Maneuver combines in essence initiative and agility, attacking the enemy where he least expects, forcing him to react to our actions rather than vice versa. If the enemy must concentrate his forces in a particular area, this inevitably exposes him and lies open

to attack other vulnerabilities. Maneuver itself takes advantage of the belief, indeed lends credence to the fact, that the battlefield will be non-linear, constantly changing in scope and geography. A frustrated enemy, paranoid that his flanks and even rear are constantly targeted, may think twice before continuing or possibly commencing a frontal assault.

Deep battle is a logical corollary to maneuver. The projection of power beyond the front lines in order to destroy enemy forces that are moving to join the battle, in order to disrupt fragile supply lines, in order to destroy industrial supplies and manufacturing ability are all an integral part of the deep battle. Destroying the enemy's potential combat power is a needed ingredient for victory; halting or at least delaying the enemy's second echelon, principally through the use of air power, can allow for additional windows for the offense. If the deep battle does nothing else, it will definitely disrupt the enemy's plans, force him to re-think and to improvise his attack while wrestling with a degraded command and control network.

Unfortunately, the deep battle is a two-way street; the AirLand Battle doctrine clearly recognizes that, however, and prepares our forces to fight a rear battle themselves. Base defense forces, response forces, and combat forces are established to fight the enemy in our own rear area. Rear area protection operations are specifically designed to allow for an uninterrupted flow of men and material to the main battle area. The doctrine recognizes the threat posed by agents and saboteurs as well actual combat troops, bombings and artillery attacks.

Logistics, in light of the rear battle and particularly with the deep attack concept in mind, becomes a battlefield nightmare. In modern warfare we will have friendly forces operating far removed from their

principal source of supply, attempting to penetrate and disrupt the enemy's rear. At the same time that very source of supply upon which they depend will surely be targeted by the enemy in hopes that an unresupplied force will quickly withdraw. The problem is immense, complicated by the fact that our own resources will most likely be scarce; austerity will be the rule vice the exception. The AirLand Battle doctrine scrutinizes this problem in detail. While no direct assurance can be given for success, planning is coherent and the threat stringently assessed. The success of the combat service support operation is dependent on many variables; host nation support and integral lines of communications heading the list.

The final point to be made concerning the AirLand Battle doctrine is probably the most obvious but possibly also the most crucial. By its very name the doctrine has attempted to integrate the capabilities and forces of both land and air; it is a union between the Army and the Air Force in which mutual objectives are attacked and coordination rules are laid out. Of particular note is the detail planning and thought given to joint fire support, the integrated use of artillery and air assets. The doctrine expresses the need for exact liaison required for effective combat air support and battlefield air interdiction. It addresses joint suppression of enemy air defenses, integrating directly into Army doctrine the role of the Air Force component commander. The AirLand Battle doctrine unabashedly surmises that the Army will seldom fight alone and that joint operations will be the norm, not the oddity.

The AirLand Battle doctrine is modern, coherent and relevant, given the facts of today's envisioned battlefield. Can it, however, be meshed into a meaningful and effective military course of action with

the Maritime Strategy? I believe so.

A Comparison

A favorable comparison between Navy strategy and Army doctrine can be made in many areas; but, first, allow me to lay to rest at least one semantic argument. It can easily be countered that this comparison is one of apples and oranges, that strategy and doctrine are at different levels of war and hence fall short of a mutual analysis. There is however one level of war on which both overlap, that of the operational level of war, described variously, but most simply as the theory or art of large unit operations. It is at this level that the Navy strategy and Army doctrine coincide in their genesis and basic military thought.

The first and most obvious compatability between Navy and Army operational thought is the enemy at which it is directed. A mutual enemy has been studied in depth by both services, his strategic and operational moves considered in the development of our own capabilities and strategy. There is no glaring disconnect in the way the two services view the enemy; we are in full agreement that he is capable and determined, while at the same time sensible enough not to desire a full scale nuclear holocaust.

A step by step comparison of the AirLand Battle doctrine's four cornerstones will sound like a recapitulation of the naval strategy. Initiative is the Army's bellringer; seizing the initiative happens to be the title for the Navy's second phase of the battle. Quick, decisive action is necessary for Phase One of the Naval battle; establishing maritime superiority is a major goal of the naval war. The Army needs superiority, both land and air, at specific times for success on land as well. It seems that the military tenet of initiative reverberates

throughout both services' philosophy.

Depth is not a new thought to any military mind; the Army underlines its importance by stressing deep attack. On land the target must be future enemy forces that could influence the battle at a later date; aggressiveness for the purpose of minimizing the enemy's firepower. The same is obvious at sea; throughout the later stages of the Maritime Strategy destruction of enemy forces is paramount. Aggressive naval operations designed specifically at enemy forces in order to limit their ability to influence the battle at a later date is a primary goal of maritime forces once deterrence has failed.

Agility, the capability to move quickly and effectively, is not lost on the Navy. This is one area that the Navy and the Army have no problem seeing eye to eye. The importance of flexible, mobile forces has been stressed throughout modern naval history and is unmistakably clear in the AirLand Battle doctrine as well as the current Army force structure. If we include in the naval inventory the Fleet Marine Force, the word agility takes on an even more sparkling meaning.

If one can imagine the need for synchronization when it comes to the coordination needed between land and air forces fighting a single enemy, one does not need to struggle hard to envision the timing and control demanded by modern naval warfare. It is in neither service's favor to brag about how much synchronization is required; unfortunately it is simply a by-product of the complexity of the modern battlefield, be it on land, in the air, or at sea.

The AirLand Battle doctrine's cornerstones could easily have been adopted as the Navy's own; it is just simply a matter of writing style that they were not. Subjectively little difference exists;

operationally they are also closely linked in their thought. The idea of maneuver has been highly acclaimed by even the most vitriolic of the military critics. The Army suggests that without it victory would be difficult. The Navy has spent most of its time maneuvering forces and their strategy calls for it in detail. Maneuvering naval forces to interdict lines of supply and communication, aggressive repositioning to destroy enemy forces are both present in all phases of the naval strategy. There is no headlong thrust into the main enemy strength called for in the strategy, but rather calculated moves, designed to place the enemy on the defensive and to protect our own advantage. Intelligent leadership is the groundwork for the Army's maneuver campaign; well trained and experienced fleet commanders are architects of the naval maneuvers required to seize the initiative and carry the fight to the enemy.

Deep battle, as mentioned earlier, is designed to disrupt the enemy, confuse his plans, and expose his vulnerabilities. The Army intends to conduct this battle beyond what would be considered the main battle area, using long range artillery, Air Force assets, and Special Forces. The importance of this type battle can not be lost in the Army's doctrine; it is critical to their concept and their current force re-structuring. At sea, the deep battle is a little more difficult to define, especially geographically. The expanse of the sea makes it impossible to draw demarcation lines or even focus on a specific main battle front. In this case the deep battle will concern itself with the attacking of opposing naval forces before they can join in the foray, defeating them on their "home turf", and destroying naval supply lines and depots. In "carrying the fight to the enemy", one would have to envision a deep battle, designed to confuse, inhibit, and

severely impair the enemy. Operationally the deep battle is basically the same in both Army doctrine and Naval strategy; only the tools are different.

Rear battle in the Army doctrine concerns itself with self protection, realizing that we too will be targeted by the enemy's deep battle forces, Operational Maneuver Groups. The Maritime Strategy is replete with the idea of always looking and protecting "behind" the force. The sea lines of communications across the Atlantic to Europe must always be protected; the Soviet Navy will most certainly attempt to interdict them. The rear battle in a nautical sense can also be thought of in terms of protection of the homeland, where an agreement between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard has established Maritime Defense Zones for defense of our contiguous seas. Mine warfare and attack submarine forces will certainly be involved in the rear battle, protecting territory and supply lines.

The rear battle has naturally lead the Army into a sharp realization of the complexity of the logistic puzzle during a modern conflict; and so too it can be said that the Navy, by its very nature relying on a long umbilical, has and will continue to place critical importance on supplying the force. Neither the AirLand Battle nor the Maritime Strategy has re-invented logistics; since times immortal have warriors known its primacy. It is true though that both land and naval leaders, in the framework of their services' doctrine, are paying close attention to its modern day application.

On the operational level, then, both the Army doctrine and the Maritime Strategy can be considered as springing from the same military concepts, certainly subjectively and to a maximum extent objectively.

To criticize one on the basis of its foundation is to criticize the other. That is not to say that one can not take to task the decisions on how best to implement the doctrines or on which hardware or weapon systems they should employ. Differences of opinion will always exist in this arena, and rightfully so.

The Problem

The bibliography of the current military debate, as we asserted in the very beginning, leads one to the conclusion that we must accept either the Army philosophy or the Maritime Strategy, not both together. This is a waste of precious time and intellectual resource. The debate needs to be redirected to discovering the best method of achieving military unity and solidarity. The Soviets must realize that we are intelligent and determined enough to deter them globally in each medium: land, sea, and air. The Army and the Air Force have made tremendous strides in the formation and publication of the AirLand Battle doctrine; they have taken the initiative in this area. However, the debate will not be refocused properly until the United States military as a whole realizes that a union, despite any growing pains, must be achieved between our two major doctrines, and then takes steps to form that union.

For various, ill-founded reasons, individuals both from outside and from within the military establishment seem opposed to this union, despite its obvious necessity and destiny. Some do this consciously, while others unconsciously; some vociferously, some through benign neglect. Mr. Jeffrey Record describes the Maritime Strategy as a blueprint for the certain destruction of our aircraft carriers, as the Navy blindly stumbles into harm's way. Nothing could be farther from the truth; but at the same time Mr. Record does not fault the Army for

aggressive main area battle operations nor does he suggest that they would blunder into the Soviet's main strength. Mr. William Lind has been heard to praise the Army for its emphasis on maneuver operations, yet has hardly a kind word for the Navy's reliance on the same military concept. The list of critics and their comments goes on while the military establishment seems to sit idly by and allow the criticism, often factually incorrect, to reach a boiling point.

In all honesty there are a few bright spots on the horizon: most of our Service spokesmen today are calling for "jointness"; the Army's AirLand Battle does allude to the use of naval gunfire support; the Maritime Strategy does call for aiding the land campaign. The services do admit that no one arm will win the next major conflict alone. There have been some tactical initiatives in the area of equipment operability. None of these bright spots a marriage make, however. Lipservice to jointness is clearly insufficient. A closer look at the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine reveals that the Soviet Navy is not even considered as a threat; in reading the doctrine you would believe that the Soviet Navy could not influence the land battle to any extent at all. I believe that this is a major omission. The integration of our own naval assets in such areas as the deep and rear battle are also not mentioned. The U.S. Navy has been described as a "go it alone" service; unfortunately, the AirLand Battle doctrine fosters this notion, ostensibly assuming that each navy, friend and foe, will take care of each other. This needs to be corrected.

The Navy is far from innocent in this matter. The Maritime Strategy calls for war termination as if it were the Navy alone that could make it happen; it does not seem to recognize the military and

political importance of the land campaign. Possession of water and lack of an opposing fleet alone does not make for victory. True, the Naval doctrine spells out the need for strategic sealift and protection of lines of communication; but if truly serious the Navy would have far greater plans to build its sealift forces than it does today. This point can not be minimized in its importance; neither the Army nor the Navy seems to center on the gravity of the issue. If this union is to work, they must. Defeat of the Soviet Union in an European scenario hinges on our ability to delay the arrival of the Soviet second echelon from reaching the main battle area until reinforcements from the continental United States can be landed and thrown into the conflict. The safe and swift arrival of those reinforcements, actually mobilized reserves, depends greatly on the Navy's ability to transport and protect them. The AirLand Battle doctrine does not admit this; the Maritime Strategy only alludes to it as a collateral duty.

A coherent joint doctrine needs more than just thought from the top leadership; any successful concept needs ground roots support as well. Such support will only come from military officers with concrete, operational joint experience. Few and far between are the Army officers with experience in operating with the Navy or for that matter who are even familiar with Naval capabilities. Most see the Navy as a drain on an already meager Army budget. One can flip the mirror over and say the same about the majority of Naval officers also. Other symptoms of this separateness can be seen in the sheer number of single service theater military exercises, operational war game scenarios which are land locked, and low attendance at sister service advanced courses in parent service war colleges.

A Proposal

How best do we effect this marriage, which is begging to be arranged? I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff need to seize the initiative. Six years have passed since the birth of the AirLand Battle and the Maritime Strategy and military leaders in that time have spent most of their energy answering our critics. The time has arrived to divert that energy into institutionalizing "jointness." The Joint Chiefs need to establish a working commission whose responsibility it is to mesh the AirLand Battle with the Maritime Strategy; to develop, as it were, a written United States Joint Military Doctrine, possibly the Air, Land, Sea Doctrine. The focus of this effort should be across the military spectrum from the operational level of war down to the forceful imposition of jointness on our current operational and tactical leaders.

The Joint Chiefs have been accused in the past of "aggressive anonymity"; this is one area in which such a policy can not be followed. Every one within the military, in fact within the defense and political establishment, must be told of the direction this effort is proceeding. In order to achieve grassroots support within the military the opinions and expertise of our senior military commanders must be heeded and utilized. Only when the leaders realize that the Joint Chiefs are serious in their endeavor will their own initiative in the field blossom. In this way the joint outlook will catch hold in the field; recalcitrants will of course surface, but, as do all old soldiers and sailors alike, will fade away.

In an accepted atmosphere of jointness, more than just the one of current lipservice, the Joint Chiefs' commission will be free to piece together the formal contract that will emerge into a National Strategy.

This effort must consider, from a joint perspective, the threat, our deterrence, and our response should deterrence fail; not as three or four separate services but as a military force. The strategy developed must address the critical issues of sealift, airlift, logistics, and the integration of military assets. This should be done not in the sense of resource allocation but rather in the sense of priority integration of concepts with the goal of deterring and, if necessary, winning a future conflict.

The next step, after the publication of a Air, Land, Sea Doctrine, would be the review of campaign or contingency plans to ensure compliance with doctrine. The purpose of this would not only be to mandate doctrinal compliance, but also to focus, at a working level, the requirement for interoperability and a field level recognition of the enemy's joint threat and our own joint counter-capability.

Ambassador Robert W. Komer has said that what is needed is a
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balanced joint military strategy. While I can not agree with the Ambassador's entire philosophy, he has hit the nail on the head with this particular idea. This strategy, by means of summary, must spring from the viability and compatability of both the AirLand Battle doctrine and the Maritime Strategy; it must be and it can be initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The strategy and its intermediate developmental stages must be publicized at every and all levels not only to educate the military and to silence our critics but also to realize the strategy's full deterrent potential. Once this marriage is complete, once the new doctrine is articulated, resource allocation becomes a productive area for argument. At this point we have refocused the debate and then, and only then, we should allow it to rage on!

ENDNOTES

1. Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, "The Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, January 1986, Supplement.
2. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, "The Future of U.S. Sea Power," Proceedings, May 1979, pp. 66-71.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, "Operations."
4. Ibid., p. 7-7.
5. Jeffrey Record, "Jousting With Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," International Security, Winter 1983-84, p. 13
6. Robert W. Komer, "Thinking About Strategy: A Practitioner's Perspective," in Alternative Military Strategies For The Future, ed by Keith A. Dunn and Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, USA, p. xiii.

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